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Abstract 
From its early post-war catch-up phase, Germany’s formidable export engine has been its 
consistent driver of growth. But Germany has almost equally consistently run current account 
surpluses. Exports have powered the dynamic phases and helped emerge from stagnation. 
Volatile external demand, in turn, has elevated German GDP growth volatility by advanced 
countries’ standards, keeping domestic consumption growth at surprisingly low levels. As a 
consequence, despite the size of its economy and important labor market reforms, 
Germany’s ability to act as global locomotive has been limited. With increasing competition in 
its traditional areas of manufacturing, a more domestically-driven growth dynamic, especially 
in the production and delivery of services, will be good for Germany and for the global 
economy. Absent such an effort, German growth will remain constrained, and Germany will 
play only a modest role in spurring growth elsewhere. 
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I.   INTRODUCTION
1
In the nearly 70 years since World War II, the German—earlier the West German—economy 
has enjoyed dynamic phases, interspersed with periods of slow, even anemic, growth. 
Germany’s continuing ability to maintain competitive manufactured exports has been crucial 
to its resilience and dynamism, but has not always been sufficient. This dependence on 
exports as the economic driver of the German economy helps understand its post-war 
evolution, including its recovery following the post-Lehman collapse. It also points to the 
challenges that Germany faces: the calls to do more for the European and global economy 
and the risk that the rise of manufacturing capabilities in emerging markets will eventually 
wear down Germany’s stronghold. In this essay, we review Germany’s growth record in four 
phases, and sneak a look into the future. 
x For about a decade and a half after World War II, until the early 1960s, the economy 
responded spectacularly by making up lost ground. German companies exploited their 
traditional advantage in capital and durable goods production for sale to a growing 
world economy and also to meet pent-up domestic demand. 
x In the next four decades—until about 2003—economic performance gradually turned 
less impressive. The catch-up potential necessarily waned and the oil shocks of the 
1970s raised costs and reduced global demand. By the mid-1980s, with rising wages, 
West Germany was losing its competitive edge. The unification of West and East 
Germany in 1990 provided a short domestic boost, but then the German economy 
again went into a swoon.
x Starting around 2004, a strong global economy combined with reforms that helped 
Germany regain competitiveness provided a new opportunity to German exporters. 
With success came a historically-large current account surplus, which was criticized 
for contributing to global imbalances. But the growth dynamic was summarily 
interrupted in early 2008 by the onset of the “Great Recession,” when the collapse in 
global trade also swept Germany.  
x The recovery from the collapse has once again demonstrated German resilience. 
German companies deepened their export links to the growing economies of Asia, 
and policymakers have supported stabilization and growth through measures to 
maintain employment and a sizeable fiscal stimulus. 
New challenges have to be faced. Some are not unique to Germany. With its reliance on 
exports, a high savings rate, and current account surplus, Germany shares similarities with 
Japan, to the extent that one country can be like another. Looking ahead, like their Japanese 
counterparts, German exporters face heightened competition, especially from Asia but also 
from Emerging Europe. And as in Japan, a rapidly aging population will imply a smaller 
work force and changes in savings and investment patterns with far-reaching consequences. 
1 This essay is also the introductory chapter to the book Germany in an Interconnected World (Mody, 2012). 
Much of the work underlying the book and its principal policy conclusions was developed for the IMF’s Article 
IV consultation with Germany in 2011 (IMF, 2011).  5 
But Germany’s challenges arise also from its unique role in Europe: in particular, Germany’s 
expected contribution to the European recovery and a resolution of the euro area crisis 
remains controversial.  
As this preview suggests, throughout the post-war era, (West) Germany has benefited greatly 
from its relationship with the global economy, but there have been lingering questions 
whether the German contributions to global and European growth have been commensurate. 
From its early catch-up phase, Germany’s formidable export engine has been its consistent 
driver of growth. But with almost equal consistency, Germany has run current account 
surpluses, with imports lagging exports. As a consequence, despite the size of its economy, 
Germany’s ability to act as global locomotive has been limited. Germany has contributed to 
global well-being in important ways—notably through its foreign direct investment and, in 
particular, the production linkages its companies have built throughout Europe. Nevertheless, 
the calls on Germany to do more remain vigorous, especially as the European crisis has 
persisted.
The argument in this essay (and in the other chapters in Mody, 2012) is that the German 
economy has evolved along a particular historical trajectory that tends to reinforce its growth 
patterns. The innovative manufacturing sector has remained a consistent source of growth, 
but it has been heavily dependent on external demand. The volatility of external demand, in 
turn, has caused German GDP growth to be relatively volatile by the standards of advanced 
countries. Such volatility has likely been a factor in keeping domestic demand growth—
especially consumption growth—at surprisingly low levels. As a consequence, the 
domestically oriented segment of Germany’s economy has lagged. This has been so 
especially in the production and delivery of services. In turn, this has reinforced the drive for 
foreign markets. Looking ahead, a more domestically-driven growth dynamic will be good 
for Germany and for the global economy.  
The key challenge for Germany is then to generate new domestic sources of growth. One 
recent episode—reunification—raised domestic demand but that boom proved unsustainable 
as the economic problems associated with unification surfaced. Labor market reforms in 
response to the ensuing period of stagnation were a bold response, and have proven largely 
successful. But much of the gain in competitiveness translated into further growth in 
manufactured exports and current account surpluses. Therefore, despite the notable service 
sector advances achieved since the mid-1990s, a further broad-based impetus to services 
growth is required. Absent such an effort, German growth will remain constrained, and 
Germany will tend to run current account surpluses while playing only a modest role in 
spurring growth elsewhere.
Just as the German economy is similar to that of Japan—dependent on exports, running 
current account surpluses, and generating limited international growth spillovers—the 
contrast with the United States is marked. The United States is characterized by more 
reliance on domestic consumption and, as a consequence, persistent current account deficits 
but high international growth spillovers. Despite popular characterization of the U.S. 
financial sector’s casino capitalism, both the U.S. GDP and its stock market have been less 
volatile than in either Germany or Japan. In part, this reflects the greater reliance on domestic 
consumption, which tends to be more stable than exports. But the United States has also been  6 
more diversified, with innovations in globally-leading technologies giving it an edge in 
productivity growth, especially in the services sector. In the future, Germany will perhaps 
draw on approaches to fostering innovation practiced in the United States, while also 
maintaining its greater emphasis on social safety nets, where lessons may be available from 
the Nordic countries. 
In this essay, we step back from the themes of immediate policy focus to provide a broad 
overview of German economic growth and international connections over the past half 
century. The intent is to describe the historical trajectory that has brought Germany to its 
present balance of strengths and weaknesses, and to use that analysis to explore the best way 
forward.
This essay is presented in four main parts, reflecting the four relatively distinct phases of 
German growth. First, the immediate post-war period witnessed a rapid catch up with the 
United States and, importantly, reestablished its export prowess that has remained Germany’s 
well-spring ever since. Second, growth slowed starting the early 1960s, and the oil shocks of 
the 1970s and unification in 1990 proved to be particularly onerous. Third, the reemergence 
from this setback on the back of extended global prosperity was aided by wage moderation 
and broad-based domestic reform. And forth, the collapse triggered by the Great Recession 
and the subsequent recovery have brought Germany to a new phase with new challenges to 
tackle.
II.   THEPOSTWAR CATCH-UP
Emerging from World War II, West Germany set the pace for much of Western Europe as it 
embarked on a remarkable catch-up. A massive reconstruction effort was mounted and the 
depleted capital stock was rebuilt. Growth in those immediate post-war years was in the 
double digits (Figure 1). Aid flowing to Europe through the European Recovery Program 
(also known as the Marshall Plan) was an important catalyst in addressing infrastructure 
bottlenecks and reviving trade. Germany also reclaimed its historic advantages as an exporter 
of capital and durable goods. Between 1948 
and 1950, the pent-up demand for 
consumption and investment drew in 
substantial imports, but exports started 
growing rapidly right from the start, with 
exceptionally high annual growth rates 
(Table 1). By 1950, exports had exceeded 
imports and the German trade surplus 
established then has persisted with some ups 
and downs ever since. By 1960, West 
Germany’s shares of world exports and 
imports exceeded those of the German Reich 
before World War II (Giersch, Paque, and 
Schmieding, 1992).  
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Table 1: West Germany’s Foreign Trade  
(average annual percentage change) 
 1948-1950  1950-1960 
Import volume  26.8  15.0 
Export volume  84.4  16.1 
Source: Giersch, Paque, and Schmieding (1992) 
Eichengreen (2006) describes this as a period of extensive European growth, with Germany 
in the vanguard. He defines extensive growth as that which deploys relatively well-
established technologies. “It is the process of raising output by putting more people to work 
at familiar tasks and raising labor productivity by building more factories along the lines of 
existing factories” (Eichengreen, 2006, p. 6). Millions of refugees arrived in Germany and, in 
the immediate postwar period, internal labor mobility was also high. Nearly full employment 
conditions were achieved, with the unemployment rate down to below 1 percent in 1960. In 
reorganizing production and rebuilding the capital stock, efficiency gains were substantial 
and quickly realized. 
Several factors facilitated this outcome. Not only was plentiful labor available, the workers 
were also industrially literate—or were readily trainable through the traditional vocational 
training systems. Such systems met the need of the moment precisely because the challenge 
at hand was not to build new widgets but to build known widgets in larger quantities with 
incremental technical improvements in a learning-by-doing process. At the same time, an 
extensive network of relationship-based banking systems provided the needed patient capital 
to finance the investments. This confluence led to modest wage demands, which allowed 
profitable firms the resources and the confidence to invest in their workforce and in growth.
Germany was particularly well-suited to take advantage of these conditions. Giersch (1992, 
p. 89) writes: “Germany’s traditional strength in the production of capital goods paid off 
handsomely in the 1950s, when these goods were in particularly high demand on the world 
market. In addition, the change in relative prices testifies to the improving quality and 
sophistication of these exports goods.” In a similar vein, Eichengreen (2006, pp. 93-94) 
elaborates: 
The country already possessed the relevant range of industries, from coal and steel to 
transport equipment and electrical machinery…. Small and medium-sized firms 
competed with legions of other small and medium-sized firms, requiring them to 
price aggressively and reduce costs in order to survive. In turn this rendered German 
firms highly competitive on international markets. Exports rose from 9 percent of 
national income in 1950 to 19 percent in 1960. External conditions were also 
propitious for German recovery. Investment demand was high throughout Europe, 
aiding German firms specializing in the production of capital goods. The Korean 
crisis stimulated demand for capital goods worldwide. And just when Germany’s 
expanding industrial sector began diversifying into the production of consumer 
goods, private consumption surged across Europe, reflecting rising incomes and in 
turn helping to sustain the growth of German exports….Investment and exports were 
the fast-growing components of aggregate demand, and government and private 
consumption the slow-growing ones.  8 
Thus, while all of Europe did well during this period, Germany did particularly well. Other 
countries that grew about as rapidly included Austria, which had close economic ties to 
Germany, and Italy. While Germany was leveraging off an established industrial capability, 
Italian growth was due to the shift of resources from agriculture to industry. 
III.   THESLOWDOWN
The precise timing of the shift is difficult to pin down, but the growth benefits of the German 
miracle leveled off in the 1960s. The indicators are clear. From an average growth of about 9 
percent in the early 1950s, GDP growth fell to about 4½ percent by the mid-1960s (Figure 1). 
German growth, which had set the pace for Europe in the immediate postwar years, now fell 
below the European average growth rate (Figure 2). The rapid process of German catch-up 
with the United States stalled and even began a modest reversal in the 1980s (Figure 3). The 
slowdown was to be expected. Growth could not persist at the early giddy levels and, as 
Germany became richer, the convergence possibilities diminished, while the latecomers 
started their own catch-up process. 
-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
10-90 percentile of OECD economies
Germany
European economies (excl. Germany)
Figure 2. Growth in a Comparative Perspective
(5 year average, percent)
Sources: World Economic Outlook, IMF Staff estimates.
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
110
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
110
1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
Range Ireland
Spain, Greece, Portugal France
Germany Italy
Sources: World Economic Outlook, OECD. 
1/ Maximum excludes Luxembourg.
Figure 3. Per Capita GDP relative to the U.S. 
(real per capita GDP to U.S. per capita GDP, in percent, PPP constant prices) 
The significance of this phase, therefore, lies in two developments, both of which contributed 
to the slowdown, but had longer-term implications lasting into the present. First, the gains 
possible from extensive growth tapered off and a new phase of intensive growth created new 
demands on German firms. Eichengreen (2006, p. 6) defines intensive growth as “…growth 
through innovation. A larger share of the increase in output is accounted for by technical 
change, and less by the growth of factor inputs.” Thus, it was not merely a matter of 
narrowing growth opportunities but also a change in the character of those further 
possibilities and, hence, the resources needed to exploit them. 
Second, important changes occurred in the organization of the labor market. The rapid 
growth drew in much of the surplus labor and with near full employment conditions, the 
labor market started tightening by the early 1960s. West Germany went from a state of 
capital shortage to one of labor shortage, which, despite the pursuit of active labor 
immigration policies (Gastarbeiter), led to demands for higher wages. Reduced profits 
implied lower investment and growth. Moreover, as wages started rising, employment 
prospects steadily worsened during the 1970s. The response to this conjuncture was central to  9 
shaping the period from the 1970s through the late-1990s. Dew-Becker and Gordon (2012, p. 
17) write: 
…policies adopted to fight unemployment had adverse effects on employment per 
capita (see Nickell et al., 2005). To deal with individual hardship caused by higher 
unemployment, governments increased the generosity and duration of unemployment 
benefits. To limit the increase in unemployment itself, they attempted to regulate 
layoffs through employment protection legislation (EPL). To spread the available 
jobs across the population, they resorted to legislation favoring early retirement and 
shorter hours of work, so-called “work sharing” (Alesina, Glaeser, and Sacerdote, 
2006).
New headwinds gathered momentum in the 1970s with the oil crises and the collapse of the 
Bretton Woods system, which abruptly changed the external environment for West Germany. 
Much of the industrial world experienced the 
angst of declining productivity growth as the 
pool of innovations appeared to run dry. 
Germany felt the first taste of competition from 
newly industrialized economies. German 
growth slowed to an average of 2½ percent 
during the 1970s and 1980s. Domestic 
consumption remained subdued, and as a 
consequence import demand was low. Despite 
the greater competition faced by German 
exporters, current account surpluses continued 
(Figure 4).
German unification in 1990 brought further 
challenges. The integration of the much less 
competitive economy of Eastern Germany 
proved to be economically costly and had a 
long lasting influence on economic 
developments. Unemployment increased 
substantially, and public finances came under 
pressure. GDP growth in the 1990s averaged 
just about 1½ percent per year.
2 Unification did 
bring about a temporary current account deficit 
due to a boom in publicly led investment, and 
the trade-to-GDP ratio, already on a mild 
downward path from the mid-1980s, fell 
sharply (Figure 5). 
2 That is about half of the potential growth rate of the U.S. economy. 
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By the end of the 1990s, Germany was dubbed “the sick man of Europe.” Growth came to a 
standstill, and the economy underperformed for much of the early 2000s (Figure 6). Despite 
high unemployment, the institutional responses of the previous decades had raised wages to 
unsustainably high levels, and for the first time in decades Germany lost a competitive edge 
(Figure 7). Indeed, even as the global economy recovered in the early 2000s, Germany failed 
to respond, reinforcing the view that Germany faced serious problems. Pessimism about 
economic prospects became widespread with growth expectations trailing the actual growth 
rate for several years into the ensuing global boom. 
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IV.   REEMERGENCE
The “reemergence” period, from 2004 to 2008, is a relatively short one, more so when 
compared to the previous period lasting nearly four decades, which we treated above in 
summary fashion. Yet this short period is noteworthy because of the rapid turnaround 
experienced and because, along with the post-Great Recession recovery, it defined the 
prevailing sense of German dynamism. The transformation not only reestablished the 
German economy’s strengths but also brought calls from the international community for 
Germany to play a more active role as a “global citizen.” However, as German growth 
accelerated following years of secular decline, Germany developed large current account 
surpluses—large even by its own historical standards. Thus, while it came to be regarded 
with new respect, it was also caught in the storm of “global imbalances”. The papers in Mody 
(2012) reflect on both the dynamics of this reemergence phase and on Germany’s role in the 
international economy.  
We focus on four themes characterizing this period, reflecting the break and renewed sense 
of confidence as well as the significant continuities. First, manufacturing productivity growth 
remained solid, and services productivity growth picked up modestly. Second, wage restraint 
was widespread. Third, global growth buoyancy was key to maintaining export growth. And, 
to a large extent, current account surpluses were the consequence of global developments and 
less of “distortionary” domestic policies. 
Poirson (2012) shows that productivity performance varied greatly across sectors. 
Manufacturing productivity continued to grow respectably, not just in absolute terms but also 
relative to international benchmarks. Productivity growth was relatively low in the newly- 11 
emerging sectors of communications and information technology, and was also relatively low 
in the services sector.  
These sectoral distinctions are important because they highlight the challenge ahead. Despite 
Germany’s manufacturing prowess, the share of manufacturing value-added in German GDP 
has steadily declined over the past several decades (Figure 8). This is not surprising. With the 
rise of lower-cost manufacturing in the 
newly-industrializing nations of East Asia, 
manufacturing has played a smaller role in all 
advanced economies. Germany is remarkable 
only to the extent that the manufacturing 
share of total value-added remains somewhat 
higher than in Japan. Nevertheless it is salient 
that Germany’s high manufacturing 
productivity growth cannot be a dependable 
source of greater well-being in the future as 
manufacturing inevitably continues to cede 
ground to international competitors. 
In this respect, Poirson’s (2012) analysis has an optimistic note. She finds some evidence of a 
rise in services productivity starting in the early 2000s. However, her analysis does not 
establish a clear trend. And since the Great Recession created so much dislocation, any trend 
may only be discernible in a few years. Poirson (2012) offers advice that is in line with that 
of other students of productivity growth: greater use of information technology in the 
delivery of services and more impetus to small and innovative service firms through 
incubation in higher centers of learning and greater access to venture capital. More 
controversially, she suggests a role for the government in procuring services with a public-
good purpose, especially where that may help establish open standards. 
The second theme of this period is wage restraint. Wage moderation has become central to 
characterizing Germany—and hence to the policy measures it must adopt in deference to its 
global commitments. It is the case that German wages have been relatively steady in the past 
several years (Figures 9 and 10). Yet, as described above, the restraint followed years of 
significant wage increases. Thus, even after the restraint, German wages are among the 
highest in Europe. What is remarkable about the recent years is the rapid rise in wages 
elsewhere in Europe. The Irish rise is particularly explosive. But wage increases elsewhere in 
the European periphery clearly outstripped productivity growth in those economies.  
15
20
25
30
35
40
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
Germany
Japan
USA
Source:OECD, IMF Staff calculations.
Figure 8. Importance of the Manufacturing Sector 
(value added manufacturing in percent of total value added, 3 year average) 12 
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
IRL NLD BEL AUT FRA DEU ITA ESP GRC PRT
Average salary per worker 2010 ('000 EUR, LHS)
Increase, 1995-2010 (RHS)
Figure 9. Wage Levels and Wage Growth
Sources: OECD, and IMF Staff estimates
45
50
55
60
1991 1996 2001 2006 2011
Figure 10. Wage Share in Germany
(gross wages as percent of GDP)
Sources: World Economic Outlook and IMF Staff estimates 
There is an open question why German wage increases were modest during this phase. One 
explanation is the introduction of labor market reforms, in particular the Hartz reforms, 
introduced around 2003 in association with a broader reform package to regain 
competitiveness.
3 Posen (2007) concludes that the key reform was the reduced duration of 
unemployment benefits. This increased the labor supply with the effect of dampening wage 
growth.
4 Schindler (2012a) argues, as do Burda and Hunt (2011), that the remarkable stability 
of German unemployment during the Great Recession was due not just to the work-sharing 
schemes, discussed below, but also to the longer-term effects of the Hartz reforms. 
While a proper retrospective of the Hartz measures and wage moderation must necessarily be 
undertaken elsewhere, two cautionary notes on the policy measures are worth considering. 
First, Dew-Becker and Gordon (2012) point out that starting in the mid-1990s, similar 
reforms were undertaken throughout much of Europe. This was in response to the rigidities 
that had become increasingly evident and onerous following the efforts to protect 
employment in the mid-1970s. The Hartz-like reforms that were undertaken throughout much 
of Europe had the broad effect of raising employment per capita. The essays in Buti (2009), 
especially that by Boeri (2009), indicate that more competition was also a feature of Italian 
labor reforms, with the growth in the incidence of temporary workers.  
That Germany seems to have harnessed these reforms particularly effectively is, in our view, 
due to a second consideration. German firms were facing increasing competition in 
international market and were able to reach an accommodation on wage demands, much in 
the manner that occurred during the immediate postwar years. The pressure from 
international competition and globalization forced German enterprises to integrate with 
(Eastern) Europe and Asia in worldwide supply chains. Such links have been somewhat 
pejoratively described as the evolution of Germany as a “bazaar economy,” with German 
3 Slow German growth in the early 2000s, while the world economy was beginning to embark on a new 
dynamic phase, led to a concerted policy effort to renew growth. After years of political deadlock on key reform 
initiatives, the Agenda 2010 reform program agreed in the early 2000s led to wide-ranging changes in the labor 
market institutions, a re-organization of the economy, and changes to the pension system.  
4 Posen is less convinced of the effectiveness of other elements of the reform package, including the so-called 
active labor market policies (see also Jacobi and Kluve, 2006).  13 
companies increasingly engaged in “outsourcing” (e.g., Sinn, 2006). However, this was 
clearly the way forward, both for Germany and for emerging Europe. Why companies in 
other countries were less successful in using this opportunity and how the differences in the 
particulars of reforms and the corporate response played out across Europe remains an 
important topic for further analysis. 
With wage moderation and despite the high level of wages, our analysis (see IMF, 2011 and 
Ivanova, 2012) suggests that Germany’s export engine hummed during these years because 
of two factors. First, Germany specialized in a range of quality products that were in high 
demand during this period and for which German exporters faced limited competition. 
German firms have specialized in a large variety of capital goods, consumer durables, and 
pharmaceuticals, and they enjoy significant world market shares in these products (Figure 
11). Germany was able to hold market share, allowing exports to ride the global trade wave 
(Figure 12). Second, because Germany was unable to gain global market share, German 
export success depended crucially on global prosperity. Before the crisis hit in 2008, global 
GDP and trade, in particular outside the euro area, expanded at an unusually strong pace 
(Figure 13 and 14), and Germany was well-positioned to take advantage of that growth.
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Figure 11. Product Specialization and Market Share
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Sources: IMF Staff estimates based on SITC 4 level trade data for 2007.
-100
0
100
200
300
400
500
IRL USA JPN MYS FRA PRT ITA ESP GRC DEU NLD KOR IND POL CHN
World trade effect Increased market share
Source: IMFStaff estimates. 
Notes: Increase in exports between 2001-08, as percent of exports in 2001, decomposed into 
the effect of world trade growth and that of increased market share, computed with SITC 4 
level trade data. 
Figure 12. Decomposition of Export Growth
(percent increase)
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These developments paralleled the emergence of so-called intra-European imbalances, whose 
sources and implications have been generally misinterpreted. German surpluses vis-à-vis 
other European economies grew through the 2000s, and Germany is sometimes called on to 
reverse these surpluses by allowing its wages to rise faster. Aside from the fact that there are 
no direct ways in which policy can cause wage increases, the analysis focusing on German 
policies as the reason for intra-European imbalances does not take into account 
competitiveness gains realized by countries 
outside of Europe. Thus, Germany continued 
to maintain its traditional exports to Europe, 
where it was able to fend off competition 
from Asian sources. But while it continued 
European imports of intermediate goods, 
especially from Visegrad countries (Czech 
Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia), 
German imports increasingly tilted towards 
products produced most cost-effectively by 
China (Figure 15) which became Germany’s 
second most important import partner in 
2011 after the Netherlands, overtaking 
France. In other words, German exports stayed largely insulated from Asian and lower-wage 
European competition due to Germany’s specialization, but much of advanced Europe—
including the periphery—faced the new reality of global low-wage competition, including 
when selling to Germany. This suggests that even if higher German wages were to reduce 
German exports to Europe, those exports would most likely be replaced by imports from 
Asia, thus making little dent in the European current account deficits.
There is the more complex issue of Germany’s current account surplus vis-à-vis the rest of 
the world. Here there are two separate questions: First, why did the surplus rise to such high 
levels by 2007-8? Second, even absent that rise, is the surplus too large by some benchmark? 
Ivanova (2012) deals with both these questions. On the first, she concludes that the rise in 
surplus was mainly cyclical. In other words, there was a parallel increase in Chinese, 
Japanese, and German surpluses that largely mirrored the increased U.S. deficits. The point 
she makes is that these shifts occurred over a short period of time and so could not 
principally reflect structural (e.g., labor market policies, regulation) causes. More precisely, 
her econometric analysis is unable to attribute the rise in the German imbalances to particular 
policy choices.
Ivanova (2012) does note that as German exports boomed, corporate profits rose handsomely 
but investment stayed moribund. Thus, there was a big increase in the domestic savings-
investment imbalance, which mirrored the current account surplus. Corporate profits also 
rose elsewhere, for example in China and Japan. But in China and, to a lesser extent, in 
Japan, investment also picked up. Why investment in Germany remained so low during these 
buoyant years is a mystery, although demographic trends combined with the prevailing 
pessimism about the viability of the German business model in the early 2000s, may point to 
the answer (IMF, 2012). 
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Figure 15. Change in German Import Sources
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On the second question—whether the German external surplus is too large by some 
benchmark—Ivanova (2012) does find that Germany’s current account surplus implied by 
fundamentals is somewhat smaller than its observed surplus. But she cautions that the 
difference is small and the policy measures to engineer it are imprecisely known. That said, 
she concludes that measures to raise both domestic investment and employment generation 
(and hence consumption) would be the right way to go.
There remains the longer-standing question of Germany’s low consumption growth. After the 
early post-war years of satisfying pent-up demand, consumption growth tended to fall, along 
with GDP growth. Moreover, as Figure 16 shows, there was an inverse relationship between 
consumption growth and the unemployment rate. In the 1970s, unemployment became a 
structural problem, and during every downturn until the mid 2000s, the unemployment rate 
rose significantly, while subsequent recoveries did not see meaningful reductions. The 
depressed labor market outlook lowered consumption growth, and by placing an additional 
burden on the fiscal sector, it limited the scope for fiscal policy to stimulate domestic demand 
(Figure 17).
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Figure 17. Unemployment in Germany since 1950
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With weak domestic demand, the role of exports in generating growth became particularly 
important in the 2000s. And, while incomes rose, so did household income uncertainty. 
Despite GDP growth, unemployment remained stubbornly high, amplified by the uncertainty 
over the outcome of labor market reforms. At the same time, the unification shock and 
specialization of the manufacturing sector 
towards external markets raised growth 
volatility. Growth volatility had been lower 
in Germany than in the United States until 
the end of the 1980s but since then has been 
typically higher—and even higher than in 
Japan since the crisis (Figure 18 and Carare 
and Mody, 2012). 
High GDP volatility in Germany is therefore, 
in part, the result of the growth model 
Germany pursues. Income is volatile, the 
level of uncertainty is high, saving ratios are 
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higher, and consumption growth is low. These dynamics are reinforced by a longer-standing 
risk aversion, reflected in relatively high stock market volatility (which has consistently been 
higher than in the United States) and relatively low short-term risk-free rates (which have 
typically been lower than in the United States except for a brief period after unification and 
in the most recent crisis period) (Figures 19 and 20). Similar factors apply to Japan. 
Weitzman (2008) suggests that persistent high stock market volatility and low interest rates 
are a reflection of deep consumer uncertainty about structural parameters of the economy.  
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Figure 19. Stock Market Volatility
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V.   THEGREAT RECESSION
Although Germany initially took a big hit, the recovery has strengthened its reputation for 
resilience. With that success have come new demands on Germany to play a more active role 
in resolving the problems of peripheral Europe. In this section, we describe the German 
recovery, the policy measures that contributed to it, the interaction of those measures 
(especially the incentives for work sharing) and corporate strategies, and, finally, the 
possibilities and limits of Germany’s ability to help beyond its borders. Four of the six papers 
in Mody (2012) cover themes that deal with the analysis of this period and the policy 
approaches that are implied. 
A.   The Recovery 
In the immediate wake of the crisis, the fall in German output was substantial, but the 
recovery was impressive. The decline in output, at over 5 percent, was greater than in the 
United States and in France and about the same as in the United Kingdom (Figure 21). Only 
with respect to Japan was the fall less severe. Note that both the United Kingdom and Japan 
have continued to underperform, as if their initial contraction represented, in part, some 
longer-term downward shift. German exports fell by 14 percent, and German investment also 
fell precipitously. However, by the end of 2011, Germany had not only recovered past its 
pre-crisis output level but, despite its greater initial fall, the German excess over pre-crisis 
GDP was greater than in the United States or France.  17 
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Figure 21. GDP during the Great Recession
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Sources: IMF World Economic Outlook; and IMF Staff calculations.
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Sources: IMF World Economic Outlook; and IMF Staff calculations.
It is important to recognize that the German output recovery impresses mainly because it 
compares favorably with even weaker performances elsewhere in the advanced world. 
Almost four years after the start of the crisis, the German output level is now only a few 
percentage points above its precrisis levels. Germany has recovered, but it would be a 
mistake to characterize Germany as “booming.” The slow pace of the recovery in Germany 
and elsewhere and the persistent sense of crisis in the eurozone have meant that this period 
continues to be described as the Great Recession. 
With respect to employment, the German story is more remarkable. Employment did not fall 
much and is significantly above its pre-crisis levels (Figure 22). Forecasters, including the 
IMF and the German authorities, did not see this coming. In mid-2009, when the 
unemployment rate stood at about 9 percent, the projections were pointing to a continued rise 
into double digit rates. In retrospect, the German performance is noteworthy not only in 
comparative terms (with other major advanced economies still struggling well below their 
precrisis employment levels) but also in absolute terms, the gain in employment relative to 
that before the crisis is a major achievement. 
Three factors stand out in explaining the German recovery. First, active and coordinated 
policy measures taken across the globe were crucial in preventing a free fall and fostering a 
resumption of growth. Eichengreen and O’Rourke (2010) highlight the fact that the initial 
output collapse in what was subsequently dubbed the Great Recession was, in fact, more 
severe than in the Great Depression of the 1930s. They attribute the more rapid pace of 
recovery this time around to a keener perception 
of the danger of inaction. With the G-20 
economies acting in a rare moment of policy 
coordination to support the global economy, the 
significantly greater monetary and financial 
stimulus on this occasion prevented another 
Great Depression. There was equally a major 
effort to backstop the financial sector in order to 
prevent its meltdown. Germany played its role 
in the coordinated action, through both its 
financial sector operations and its fiscal stance. 
In the financial sector, lifelines were provided to 
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Figure 23. Fiscal Stimulus during the Great Recession
(2009-2011, cumulative, percent of GDP) 18 
banks through the newly constituted SoFFin.
5 Although there were some initial concerns that 
the German authorities might be reluctant to use fiscal stimulus, the German stimulus 
between 2009 and 2011 was above the average of that in the advanced G-20 economies and 
only modestly less than that in the United States or Japan (Figure 23). Indeed, as Krugman 
(2010) pointed out, German government consumption between 2007:Q4 and 2010:Q2 rose at 
a significantly faster clip than in the United States. It may well be that such expansion of 
consumption had a greater multiplier effect than the tax cuts did in the United States.
6
Second, some parts of the world, in particular Asian economies, recovered quickly and their 
demand boosted Germany’s exports. China’s investment-driven growth was a major source 
of world growth (as the advanced world 
struggled) and played directly to Germany’s 
strength. Chinese imports of German goods 
ranged from cars to high-speed rail. And 
although the Chinese share of German 
exports was small before the crisis, its 
incremental contribution to German exports 
during the recovery phase was substantial 
(Figure 24). China advanced to become 
Germany’s sixth most important export 
destination country in 2010, almost on par 
with the United Kingdom and Italy. 
Finally, the labor market played a key role. Its 
resilience is important in itself—both for 
minimizing the social costs—and for the 
consumption gains it brought to support the 
economy. However, looking ahead, the 
strength of the consumption trends remains 
unclear. The recovery has been driven 
primarily by exports, especially to areas 
beyond the eurozone. In turn, exports have 
pulled up investment. The steadiness of 
employment notwithstanding, the contribution 
of consumption to growth has been erratic 
5 The Sonderfonds Finanzmarktstabilisierung (SoFFin) was created in late 2008 to stabilize the financial system 
by providing bank guarantees, funds for bank recapitalizations, and the transfer of risky assets by creating “bad 
banks” (IMF 2010).  
6 Allen (2005) argues that there has been a historical aversion in Germany to Keynesian demand-oriented 
remedies in favor of a policy more driven by the goal of expanding the economy’s supply capacity (see also 
Carlin and Soskice 2009). Yet, this has also meant a significant social safety net, which provides so-called 
automatic stabilizers to protect the vulnerable and, thereby operates to stabilize the economy. Moreover, as this 
crisis showed, further discretionary stimulus is pragmatically used in Germany, even if it is often downplayed in 
public discourse. 
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from quarter to quarter; over the period 2009-2012:Q2 it has been about 30 percent. This is 
not a surprise. As Figure 25 shows, the relationship between employment and consumption 
growth has weakened since reunification. Note also from Figures 18 and 20 that GDP and 
stock market volatility have risen sharply during the Great Recession, with the United States 
still the lowest, and Germany and Japan maintaining their historically-higher uncertainty. 
Thus, while incomes have grown, so has uncertainty, with the net effect yet to be resolved. 
B.   Labor Market Performance 
The factors behind the strength of Germany’s labor market are discussed by Schindler 
(2012a). He concludes that the outcome is a mix of at least four different factors. First, much 
attention has been paid to government subsidies to maintain employment while reducing the 
number of hours worked. In Germany, this was implemented through the Kurzarbeit scheme. 
When the crisis hit, the government increased both the duration and the coverage of 
subsidies. This allowed work to be shared and human capital to be maintained.
7 Boeri and 
Bruecker (2011) point out that similar approaches were adopted in a number of countries, but 
with less success. They argue that complimentary institutions are needed to make this policy 
effective, pointing especially to employment protection legislation and collective bargaining. 
Schindler (2012a) points to a second factor. He notes that the strategy and response of 
German firms was important. Firms and workers had prior agreements that they could 
deviate from collectively bargained work arrangements to avoid layoffs, and introduce work-
time accounts at the firm level. For workers in the core labor market, this was a reasonable 
approach: in the face uncertainty in export markets, they opted for job security and flexibility 
at the firm level. Thus, work-sharing schemes were already a part of the relationship between 
German firms and their workers. Burda and Hunt (2011) note, moreover, that because 
workers had credits on these accounts, firing them in the midst of the downturn would have 
required compensating them for the credits. In this setting, the subsidies were helpful in 
reinforcing the preexisting contractual relationship. Third, as Schindler (2012b) concludes, 
for Germany the Great Recession was mainly an external export shock, not a supply shock. 
Despite the uncertainty, firms largely saw this as a temporary shock and relied on 
accumulated work time and short work schemes instead of layoffs. With the recovery, this 
judgment was vindicated. Burda and Hunt (2011) argue that the precrisis expansion of 
exports was viewed by firms as temporary, so firms held back their hiring—this is consistent 
with the relatively low level of corporate investment in the boom years, as Ivanova (2012) 
has noted. Thus, firms did not have as much of a need to fire people. 
Looking beyond the near term, Schindler (2012a) suggests that German unemployment had 
begun a secular downward trend prior to the crisis, possibly triggered by the Hartz reforms. 
The evidence for this conclusion is still preliminary, although it is plausible since these 
reforms increased labor flexibility both among the core work force and also at its margins. 
Once again, it helps to look beyond Germany. As noted above, other European countries 
7 This would be of particular importance if skilled labor was in short supply. Schindler (2012a) notes that the 
firms’ more intensive use of the core labor force, combined with an adjustment in the temporary workforce 
(typically less skilled) is consistent with such considerations.  20 
adopted similar labor market reforms in the mid-1990s. Boeri (2009) finds that similar 
reforms to the Italian labor market led to favorable labor market responses in that country: he 
estimates that the level of unemployment consistent with non-accelerating inflation came 
down. However, Boeri goes on to argue that Italian firms’ essential lack of dynamism 
implied that employment did not respond in meaningful numbers. Here again, Germany’s 
historical strengths and corporate-labor relationships distinguish it from other European 
nations.
C.   Germany’s International Role 
Germany’s economic size and its recovery from the Great Recession have led to calls for 
more German support to global growth, but especially to the euro area. We do not deal here 
with the broader issues of euro area governance and financial arrangements to support 
“bailouts.” Rather, our focus is on the specific role that German economic policy can play in 
fostering growth and stability in the eurozone. In this context three sets of issues arise
8:
x Germany as a growth “locomotive” 
x German fiscal policy as stimulus for Europe, and  
x The support provided to peripheral nations through the Target 2 system. 
Germany’s ability to act as either a global or even a European locomotive is limited. This 
follows from the theme that this essay has developed, namely, that German growth has itself 
depended to a large extent on global growth. While there is some optimism that growth will 
become more domestically driven with structural improvements in the labor market, the 
evidence for that, as discussed above, is at best preliminary. For a nation to act as a growth 
locomotive for others, it must originate growth impulses. This, in essence, is the finding of 
the paper by Poirson and Weber (2012). Growth spillovers from Germany to the rest of the 
world remain limited because domestically-originated growth is limited. Rather, Germany 
acts as a transmitter of global trade impulses, mainly from the United States and Asia, to 
Europe. German supply chains that seek inputs for the delivery of Germany’s own exports 
extend to its eastern trading partners. But these supply chains are set in motion by demand 
that predominantly originates outside of Europe.  
For Germany to assume more of a locomotive role would require autonomous sources of 
demand from within the country. There are no easy policy steps to achieve this outcome. 
Ultimately, efforts to raise German growth potential, in a manner that raises labor 
participation and emphasizes the production and delivery of services, are likely to raise both 
German economic welfare and the contribution to global growth.
But what if Germany used its fiscal space to stimulate demand for goods and services 
produced in the periphery? Would that not provide much needed temporary relief? The 
8 We have addressed above the issue of intra-European imbalances. As noted, a policy that weakens German 
competitiveness may reduce German surpluses but not necessarily improve the current account positions of the 
peripheral countries.  21 
answer is, in principle, yes. However, Ivanova and Weber (2012) conclude that the 
quantitative effect would be small. Spillovers from an activist fiscal policy in Germany to the 
periphery are small, because trade links are weak. They show that the arithmetic works 
against fiscal spillovers, because the quantitative effect is further reduced if the German 
domestic multiplier is less than one, and is further diluted since only a share of domestic 
spending is diverted to imports, of which only a small share benefits the periphery. 
While support to European growth, either through general economic activity or through fiscal 
policy, is likely to be limited, as part of the Eurosystem, Germany has somewhat unwittingly 
played an important role in providing financial stability and hence preventing a more serious 
growth collapse. This has occurred through the so-called Target2 system. Target2 balances 
are the mechanism through which national central banks within the Eurosystem lend to each 
other. Target2 positions are intended to 
smooth over temporary liquidity needs of the 
member countries, and the system has 
typically been close to balance. Since 2007, 
however, imbalances have grown steadily, 
and as of this writing Germany has a large 
creditor position (Figure 26), while a number 
of countries have become net debtors 
(Bornhorst and Mody, 2012). In effect, as the 
crisis deepened, capital flows in the eurozone 
reversed. The creditor countries (especially 
Germany and the Netherlands) opted not to 
roll over their financial exposure to much of 
the rest of the eurozone (especially to the most stressed economies), including to the cross-
border interbank market. This was yet more evidence that the flows in the first place had not 
generated productive investments. The process gained momentum in the fall of 2011, and 
with the debtor nations unable to meet these repatriation obligations, the only vent to ease 
what would have been unbearable pressure was the ECB’s Target2 system (Figures 27 and 
28). Essentially, the ECB mediated excess balances in the creditor central banks to banking 
systems of the stressed economies.  
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Figure 27. Current and Financial Account of Germany, Fin-
land, and The Netherlands (Billions of euros, rolling 4 quarter sum)
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Figure 28. Current and Financial Account of Greece, Ireland, 
Italy, Portugal and Spain (Billions of euros, rolling 4 quarter sum)
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VI.   THEEMERGING CHALLENGES
We end this review with a cautionary gaze into the future. We ask two questions. Can 
Germany continue to assume leadership in high-end manufacturing as the basis for its 
economic strength? And, how important could the consequences of population ageing be? 
Over the past few decades, advanced economies have gradually ceded ground in 
manufacturing to newly industrializing economies. The initial challenge came in labor-
intensive products, such as garments, shoes, and consumer electronics, where cheap labor 
played an important role. But over time, as their wages have risen and their industrial 
competency has grown, the new competitors have expanded their line of products and raised 
their quality standards. While the first televisions from Korea came in boxes with Japanese 
brand names, today Korean televisions can carry their own premium. Similar progress has 
been achieved in semiconductors and automobiles. The entry of China as the export machine 
has rendered this process even more dynamic. The gap between emerging and advanced 
nations is narrowing fast, and know-how is increasingly mobile.  
Germany has so far warded off this challenge. First, German specialization has been 
particularly resistant to international competitive challenge. Thus, German producers have 
continuously built on their strengths to maintain their lead in their product niches. Also, they 
have recognized the opportunities from the opening up of lower wage economies and brought 
them in as partners who supply various inputs and assembly services. But will this be 
sufficient? The United States also enjoys specialization in a large number of products, but 
has been losing market share in the past decade. Similarly, Japan has been ceding ground in 
an increasing range of products. It would be a surprise if even the areas of traditional German 
dominance do not face stepped-up competition in the next generation. 
The threat from ageing is well recognized. As this essay has highlighted, Germany and Japan 
share a number of common features. Japan, however, has aged much faster. As Figure 29 
shows, the ratio of Japanese over 65 shot up in the two decades from 1990 to 2010 and now 
stands at about 22 percent. This has resulted in important changes in the Japanese economy. 
Recent research (Braun, Ikeda, Joines, 2007) shows that the single most important cause of 
the decline in Japanese savings rates is lower savings as people get older. Yet this has not 
necessarily meant a consumption boom. Rather, even with the fall in savings, Japan has 
experienced subdued demand and deflation. 
The relationship between ageing and 
deflation is, of course, more tenuous but it 
is presumably related to the shrinking 
workforce (Figure 30 and 31). Germany is 
about to go through a more intensive ageing 
phase, following Japan. The pressures are 
rising as the population ages, and migration, 
even by the most optimistic scenarios, 
cannot fill the emerging gap in the working 
age population. This will call for policies, 
possibly following the Nordic model, 
directed towards increasing the labor force 
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Figure 29. Population Ageing, 1990-2010
(population over 65 in percent of total population) 23 
participation especially of women (Figure 32 and 33). This in turn implies adjustments to 
effective tax rates to enhance female labor supply along with supportive child care policy. 
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Figure 30. Population Ageing, 2010-2050
(population over 65, in percent of total population)
0
50
100
150
200
250
50
100
150
200
250
1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050
Forecast France
Japan Germany
UK USA
Source:United Nations
Figure 31. Working Age Population
(1950=100)
30
35
40
45
50
55
60
65
70
75
80
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
10-90 percentile of OECD economies
Germany
Nordic economies (DNK, FIN, SWE, NOR)
Average
Sources: OE CD, IMF Staff estimates.
Figure 32. Female Labor Force Participation 
(18-64 years old)
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Figure 33. Male Labor Force Participation 
(18-64 years old)
VII.   CONCLUSION:G ERMANY IN AN INTERCONNECTED WORLD
Despite economic ups and downs, Germany has held a commanding position in the global 
economy over the past half century. This position primarily reflects an industrial strength that 
has been tested in global competition over decades and has proven resilient to severe 
setbacks. Most recently, the period after German unification saw the economy in doldrums 
with seemingly intractable high unemployment rates. Yet the German economy has 
continually displayed a capacity to regenerate itself. Its emergence from the Great 
Recession—and especially the ability to generate jobs—has been widely, and rightly, lauded. 
In turn, this resilience is due to a network of innovative firms that have adapted to global 
changes—for example, through increased sourcing from Eastern Europe and exploiting new 
market opportunities in Asia. It is also due to the ability of firms and labor to find common 
ground. Finally, it is due to a pragmatic bent in policymaking. 
Following World War II Germany experienced a particularly robust reconstruction phase. 
This was followed by an extended period of slowing growth. First, there was a natural 
slowing after the rapid postwar catch-up. Then the external shocks of rising oil prices and the 
collapse of the Bretton Woods system caused further deceleration. The unification episode 
was unique to Germany. After a short-lived unification boom in the early 1990s growth fell 
again. When in the 1990s, the world economy began a new expansion phase, the German  24 
economy appeared ill-prepared to take advantage of the favorable environment. But by the 
mid 2000, economic reform and corporate and labor responses to the changed circumstances 
led to a German reemergence. Since then, the German economy has displayed considerable 
strength and maturity, not least by robustly navigating the crisis of 2008-9. In particular, 
German employment levels weathered the recent crisis surprisingly well.  
With its success, Germany has been called on to assist the global recovery, questions about 
its current account surplus have resurfaced, and Germany’s wage moderation and proposed 
pace of fiscal consolidation following the recovery from the 2008-9 crisis have, at times, 
been regarded with concern. However, while proposals for more rapidly raising German 
wages or delaying fiscal consolidation have a plausibility, a closer examination suggests that 
they could compromise German strengths with dubious short-term stimulative value for other 
countries.
The real German challenge is to strengthen its areas of weakness. Although significantly 
down from their peak levels, unemployment rates remain elevated, including when judged by 
Germany’s own past history. These high rates, along with the emergence of relatively low-
paying and temporary jobs, also act as a drag on German consumption growth. The key is to 
counteract medium-term growth constraints in a way that also supports sustainable 
rebalancing via higher domestic demand growth. Meeting this challenge will require a new 
generation of pragmatism in policy decisions. A greater emphasis is needed on innovation 
that extends Germany beyond its traditional manufacturing strengths and on a new model of 
social safety nets, drawing possibly on the Nordic experience, to increase labor force 
participation needed to counter rapid ageing. Such actions would also be good for Europe 
and the global economy.  
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